The results suggest that globalization did neither influence the unemployment replacement rate, the unemployment benefit length, public expenditures on ALMP, the tax wedge, union density nor overall employment protection. In contrast, protection of regular employment contracts was diminished when globalization was proceeding rapidly. In fact, domestic aspects, such as unemployment and government ideology are more important determinants of labor market institutions and deregulation processes in OECD countries than globalization. For this reason, working conditions of unskilled workers are not likely to deteriorate and the jobs of unskilled workers are not likely to disappear in the course of globalization. All this is, of course, not to insinuate that globalization has any benign influence on labor market institutions.
Introduction
Commentators believe that globalization plays a significant part in shaping labor market institutions. Advocates of the skeptical view on the role of globalization fear that working conditions for unskilled workers will deteriorate and many jobs of unskilled workers will disappear in the course of globalization. They therefore encourage a more stringent role of government in the domestic economy. In contrast, advocates of the market-oriented view argue in favor of a less regulated labor market because labor market regulation comes at a cost for employers, raises labor costs and unemployment.
1 A final verdict on the two views of globalization can only be derived from an empirical analysis.
Several recent studies have focused on the relationship between globalization and labor market (de)regulation. In his intriguing paper Boulhol (2009a, p. 223) , for example, presents a theoretical model which "incorporates labor market rigidities … of footloose capital in order to study how globalization might affect the trade-offs generated by labor market regulation and put pressure on labor market in institutions." Boulhol (2009a, p. 223) identifies two transmission channels of this process: first, "capital mobility triggers a re-allocation of resources, which trade integration amplifies, away from the high-rent / highly unionized sector. Second, the threat of costly relocations encourages labor market deregulation. The latter channel is more efficient because it avoids sub-optimal sectoral specialization". These predictions on the influence of globalization on labor market (de)regulation need to be evaluated empirically. Implementing this task, however, raises the question of how to measure labor market (de)regulation and globalization.
Scholars have investigated various aspects of labor market (de)regulation such as, for example, unemployment benefits, employment protection and deunionization and various facets of globalization. Empirical studies suggest mixed results about the relationship between labor market 3 institutions and globalization. In a nutshell, globalization does not appear to have a systematic influence on various aspects of labor market (de)regulation. I will discuss the different approaches and empirical findings in more detail below.
Many economic indicators are associated with labor market (de)regulation. Nickell (1997) , Blanchard and Wolfers (2000: C19f.) and Bassanini and Duval (2006) , for example, distinguish between eight labor market institutions:
Three measures of different dimensions of the unemployment insurance system: the replacement rate, benefit length, and a measure of active labor policy.
One measure of employment protection.
The tax wedge.
Three measure aspects of collective bargaining: union contract coverage, union density and (union and employer) coordination of bargaining.
An encompassing empirical analysis investigating the influence of globalization on labor market (de)regulation needs to address all these potential channels. Moreover, globalization is a multifaceted concept that cannot be captured by single economic indicators such as trade openness and foreign direct investment. Therefore, all-embracing globalization indicators have been developed over the last years. The KOF index of globalization is a case in point (see Dreher 2006 and Dreher et al. 2008a) .
In this paper, I employ the annual data set on labor market institutions by Bassanini and Duval (2006) and the KOF index of globalization in order to empirically investigate whether globalization has induced labor market deregulation in OECD countries in the 1982-2003 period.
My analytical design takes advantage of a compatible data set on labor market institutions. The results suggest that globalization did not have a systematic influence on labor market deregulation.
In fact, domestic aspects, such as such as unemployment and government ideology are more important determinants of labor market institutions and their deregulation processes in OECD countries than globalization. 4 The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the data on labor market institutions and globalization. Section 3 sets up the dynamic panel data model and describes the empirical strategy. Section 4 empirically investigates the relationship between the single measures for labor market institutions and globalization: in each scenario, I will first briefly describe the political economic reasoning and results of related empirical studies (if available), specify a hypothesis to be tested and then turn to discuss my own regression results for every single labor market institution indicator. Section 5 concludes.
Data

Labor market institutions
I use the data set on labor market institutions for OECD countries by Bassanini and Duval (2006 (Bassanini and Duval 2006: 106) . on average in countries such as Denmark (54.9) and Belgium (41.1), and low in countries such as Japan (9.9) and the United States (12.8).
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The unemployment benefit duration (in years) is defined as the ratio of average to initial unemployment benefit replacement rate. Figure 1 (b) shows that the average benefit duration was about 0.65 years, and that it has increased from 0.60 years in 1982 to its maximum of 0.70 in 1995.
The benefit length, however, varied between the individual OECD countries: in Australia and New
Zealand, it was about one year and the benefit duration was nearly constant over time. In Sweden, it was about 0.33 years and nearly constant over time. In Italy, the benefit duration dramatically increased in the beginnings of the 1990s, but then also immediately decreased again.
Public expenditures on active labor market expenditures (ALMP) are measured as a share of GDP and cover five different subcategories: public employment services and administration, labor market training, youth measures (such as special programs for unemployed and disadvantaged youth), subsidized employment and measures for the disabled. 1985 , for Japan in 1986 , for Ireland in 1992 , 1993 , 1996 , 1997 The tax wedge refers to the combined labor and consumption tax rate derived from national accounts. It represents a significant indicator because some labor market institutions do not have much effect on unemployment as such, but on wages. For this reason, it matters how taxes affect the ratio of after-tax unemployment benefits to after-tax wages (Blanchard and Wolfers 2000: C13) . On average, the tax wedge was 28.75% indicating that employers and consumers pay about one third more than workers and producers receive (Figure 1e ). 
The empirical model
The basic estimated dynamic panel data model has the following form: …, 20; j=1,…,6; t=1,…,21 (1) where the dependent variable "Δ ln Labor market deregulation indicator ijt " denotes the growth rates of the six respective labor market indicators. "Δ ln Globalization it " describes the growth rates of the KOF globalization indicators. I distinguish between a group of control variables that I include in every model describing labor market deregulation and specific variables to take into account the respective individual characteristics and differences between labor market deregulation indicators such as ALMP expenditures or EPL. I follow related studies and always include a 9 government ideology indicator because we expect higher labor market regulation under leftwing governments (for a discussion of this issue see, for example, Botero et al. 2004 ). The variable "Government Ideology it " is measured by the indicator presented by Potrafke (2009) which is based on the coding of Budge et al. (1993) , whose index of governments" ideological positions has been updated by Woldendorp et al. (1998 Woldendorp et al. ( , 2000 . This index places the cabinet on a left-right scale with values between 1 and 5. It takes the value 1 if the share of governing rightwing parties in terms of seats in the cabinet and in parliament is larger than 2/3, and 2 if it is between 1/3 and 2/3. The index is 3 if the share of centre parties is 50%, or if the leftwing and rightwing parties form a coalition government not dominated by one side or the other. The index is symmetric and takes the values 4 and 5 if the leftwing parties dominate. Potrafke"s (2009) coding is consistent across time but does not attempt to capture differences between the party-families across countries. 7 I include the government ideology variable in levels. In fact, this implies that leftist and rightwing governments implement their preferred policies incrementally. 8 The variable "Δ ln Labor market deregulation indicator ijt-1 " describes the lagged dependent variable to tackle the persistence of the deregulation indicators. Lastly, "η i " represents a fixed country effect, "ε t " is a fixed period effect and "u ijt " describes an error term. Table A1 in the appendix shows descriptive statistics of all variables included.
I now turn to discussing my choice of the panel data estimation method. In the context of dynamic estimation, the common fixed-effect estimator is biased. The estimators taking into account the resulting bias can be broadly grouped into a class of instrumental estimators and a class of direct bias corrected estimators (see Behr 2003 , for example, for a discussion). In accordance with large sample properties of the GMM methods, e.g., the estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) will be biased in my econometric model with N=20. For this reason, bias corrected estimators are more appropriate. I apply Bruno"s (2005a Bruno"s ( , 2005b bias corrected least squares dummy variable estimator for dynamic panel data models with small N. 
Results
Replacement rate
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) distinguish between three main benefit components of the unemployment insurance system: the replacement rate, benefit length, and measures of active labor policy. Political economic reasoning emphasizes these aspects. One group of political economic models focuses on the determinants of unemployment benefits, and, thus explains the replacement rate and the benefit length. Goerke et al. (2010) The regression results in Table 1 illustrate that unemployment replacement rates were highly persistent over time: the lagged dependent variable is statistically significant at the 1% level and corroborates a point estimate of around 0.16. Moreover, an "F-Test" on the joint insignificance of the fixed period effects can be strongly rejected. Government ideology does not turn out to be statistically significant. This result is thus not in line with Goerke et al. (2010) , who found significant ideology effects. Possible explanations for this discrepancy are that Goerke et al. (2010) estimate their model in levels while I employ growth rates, that they consider a longer observation period, and that their dependent variables is a broader measure of unemployment compensation. 
Benefit duration
The benefit duration is the second important component of unemployment benefits. The political economic explanations of benefit duration are similar to the explanations of the replacement rate. 11 I will examine the following hypothesis:
H2: The benefit duration decreases in the course of globalization. Table 2 shows the regression results indicating similar inferences as with respect to the replacement rate: globalization did not influence the benefit duration. The lagged dependent variable and fixed period effects (fixed period effects not shown in Table 2 ) turn out to be important explanatory variables. I have again tested for further potential control variables as named above, which do not turn out to be statistically significant. To include these variables does not change the inferences regarding the globalization variables.
Active labor market expenditures
Globalization is believed to have ambiguous effects on the welfare state: economic reasoning either suggests that the welfare state collapses (via the supply side or efficiency effect) or that the welfare state is extended (via the demand side or compensation effect). For an encompassing portrait of the globalization-welfare state nexus see, for example, Schulze and Ursprung (1999) and Ursprung (2008) . One strand of this literature deals with the structure of welfare state spending 12 . Decomposing social expenditures focusing on labor, for example, in order to elucidate potential compensating effects, has enjoyed remarkable popularity in the literature.
Recent studies also focus on spending on (active) labor market policies: the theoretical model by Gaston and Rajaguru (2008) , for example, predicts that in times of deepening globalization workers 11 I will sketch the globalization-induced responses of the welfare state in the next subsection. 12 Dreher et al. (2008b) and Gemmell et al. (2008) , for example, empirically investigate the influence of globalization on the budget composition.
13 unexposed to the threat of unemployment may prefer public spending on active labor market programs to passive spending such as unemployment benefits. Gaston and Rajaguru (2008) empirically investigate their theoretical predictions in a panel vector autoregressive model (panel VAR) of 16 OECD countries in the 1980-1999 period. They use trade openness, foreign direct investment, portfolio investment and migration to measure globalization and do not find that globalization has had an influence on active and passive labor market policies. In any event, I will examine the following hypothesis:
H3: Active labor market expenditures decreases in the course of globalization. Table 3 reports the regression results. Similar to the two previous labor market institution indicators, the results again clearly suggest that globalization did not influence ALMP spending (as a share of GDP). In contrast to the two previous labor market institution indicators, however, ALMP spending appears to be driven by important domestic economic variables. I have followed related studies on the globalization-welfare state nexus to include the growth rate of the working age population (share of the 15-64 years old of total population) and the lagged unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate in period t-1 is statistically significant and displays the expected positive sign. It shows that ALMP spending (as a share of GDP) increased by about 0.14% when the unemployment rate in period t-1 increased by 1%. In contrast, government ideology (as in Gaston and Rajaguru 2008) and the working-age population variable do not turn out to be statistically significant. In sum, the results in Table 3 show that including different control variables does not affect the inferences drawn from the globalization variables. Besides globalization, other political economic determinants appear to influence employment protection: the model by Neugart (2008) , for example, predicts a political economic equilibrium in which voters, who are not part of the labor force but receive relatively high intrahousehold transfers, will demand high unemployment protection and low unemployment benefits.
The empirical results by Algan and Cahuc (2006) suggest that religious values have an influence on employment protection. They employ previous OECD EPL data for the 1970-1999 period (decadal averages) and find that compared to Catholics, Protestants tend to decrease the level of employment protection, while Muslims increase it. In the following, I will examine the hypothesis:
H4: Employment protection decreases in the course of globalization.
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The results reported in Table 4 show that globalization did not influence EPL. In fact, the empirical model performs quite poorly. I have again included further other control variables which do not turn out to be statistically significant, and which I therefore do not report. The inclusion of these variables does not affect the inferences with respect to the globalization variables at all.
The results somewhat change when EPL subindicators are used: globalization has diminished EPL protection of regularly employed persons (Table 5 ). This finding is in line with the results by Table 6 do not suggest that globalization has had a positive influence on EPL of temporarily employed workers as the results by Fischer and Somogyi (2009) suggest.
In particular, my results in Table 5 
Tax wedge
The tax wedge represents an additional cost for enterprises. For this reason, increasing economic internationalization and competition is likely to influence the tax wedge. However, I am not aware of any political economic studies that explicitly examine the influence of globalization on the tax wedge. 14 I advance the following hypothesis. influence the tax wedge. For example, a rising share in the working-age population tends to reduce the wedge because the working-age population carries the burden of redistribution via higher taxes.
H5: The tax wedge decreases in the course of globalization.
An increase in the tax wedge tends to result from rising public debt in the past. The working-age population and the lagged central public debt, however, do not turn out to be statistically significant in Table 7 . It is important to note that the lack of statistical significance of the working-age population and of lagged central government debt (as a share of GDP) is a matter of the econometric specification. Excluding the lagged dependent variable turns the working-age population variable statistically significant with a negative coefficient and the lagged central public debt variable statistically significant with a positive coefficient as expected (see also Table 9 in section 4.7). The lagged dependent variable is statistically significant at the 10% level in column
(1) and displays the expected positive sign. Government ideology does not turn out to be statistically significant. In addition, I have examined whether globalization has had an influence on the narrowly defined labor tax wedge (not including consumption taxes): it does not.
Union density
Globalization is likely to influence union organization. Dreher and Gaston (2007) Their results suggest that, overall, economic and political globalization did not influence deunionization. In contrast, they find that social globalization was important and fostered deunionization. I will examine the following hypothesis:
H6: Union density decreases in the course of globalization.
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The results in Table 8 show that globalization did not influence union density.
Deunionization, however, increased under rightwing governments. Following Dreher and Gaston (2007), I have also included the growth rate of the population density as well as inflation (growth rate of the GDP deflator). Both variables do not turn out to be statistically significant and do not affect the result that globalization did not influence union density and that leftwing governments had higher union densities. Relating my results to Dreher and Gaston (2007) , it is important to note that I employ annual data whereas they use five-year averages; they regress the level of the globalization indices on the change of union density and also consider a slightly different sample. Table 9 suggest that excluding all individual country effects does not change the inferences at all.
Robustness of the results
I have also
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It is conceivable that the reported effects could depend on idiosyncratic circumstances in the individual countries. I have therefore tested whether the results are sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of particular countries in all the previous econometric models. In neither case, excluding one particular country turns the globalization variable statistically significant.
The influence of globalization on labor market institutions could differ between regions, such as East and West (see, for example, Saint-Paul 2007) or due to legal origins. In the analyzed OECD panel, differences due to legal origin may well play a significant role. Hence, I have included dummy variables that take on the value one for German (reference category), French, British, and Scandinavian legal origins (La Porta et al. 1999) . Including these dummies does not change the main result at all (results not shown).
A general caveat with panel data models concerns endogeneity of the dependent variable. It is, however, if at all, individual aspects of economic globalization such as trade openness or foreign direct investment that may have been affected by labor market institutions because investors will choose the most appropriate investment locations. In contrast, labor market institutions are not likely to have an influence on the overall globalization process. In any event, to address the potential endogeneity issue technically, I ran all regressions with lagged globalization variables (t-
1, t-2).
In almost all cases, the lagged KOF indices of globalization do not turn out to be statistically significant. One exception, however, is the model on ALMP spending: the overall KOF index of globalization (t-2) has a negative influence on ALMP expenditures. This effect, however, is driven by political globalization. All the KOF indices of globalization in period t-1 do not turn out to be statistically significant (results not shown).
Politicians may not implement their desired labor market reforms incrementally but try to influence labor market (de)regulation shortly after they are elected in office. I have therefore replaced the ideology variable by lagged first differences of the ideology variables (t-1, t-2, t-3).
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The lagged first differences of the ideology variables do not turn out to be statistically significant and the inclusion of these variables does not change the inferences of the globalization variables.
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A different econometric approach is not employing annual data, but five-year averages to address long-run effects. I have also estimated the models with five-year averaging (similar to column 1 in Tables 1 to 8 ). The data set by Bassanini and Duval (2006) Table 10 show that the five-year average of the overall KOF index of globalization does not turn out to be statistically significant.
Contract coverage and (union and employer) coordination of bargaining
The data collected by Bassanini and Duval (2006) 
Conclusion
Globalization did not have a systematic influence on labor market institutions in OECD countries in the 1982-2003 period. 17 Employing the data set by Bassanini and Duval (2006) my results suggest that globalization did neither influence the unemployment replacement rate, the unemployment benefit length, public expenditures on ALMP, the tax wedge, union density nor overall employment protection. In contrast, protection of regular employment contracts was diminished when globalization was proceeding rapidly. In fact, domestic aspects, such as unemployment and government ideology are more important determinants of labor market institutions and their deregulation processes in OECD countries than globalization. For this reason, working conditions of unskilled workers are not likely to deteriorate and the jobs of unskilled workers are not likely to disappear in the course of globalization. All this is, of course, not to insinuate that globalization has any benign influence on labor market institutions.
My findings indicate that other explanations than globalization are required to portray the development of labor market institutions. I will briefly discuss two intriguing political economic 16 On the effects of trade, trade policy and domestic factors in union wage determination see, for example, Gaston and Trefler (1995) . 17 This finding perfectly corresponds with research on product market deregulation (e.g., Heinemann 2007 and Potrafke 2010) and economic reforms (e.g., Gassebner et al. 2011). 21 determinants: honesty indicators and, although touched upon in this paper, government ideology.
Moreover, the threat of international outsourcing is likely to play an important role that could be addressed in future research.
Civic virtue may well play a significant part in explaining the design of unemployment benefits and employment protection Other studies suggest that parties do matter: leftwing government extended the role of government in the labor market. 18 These results are remarkable because Cukierman"s and Tommasi"s "When a Nixon goes to China"-Argument does not appear to apply to labor market reforms: Cukierman and Tomassi (1998) have argued that leftwing governments may well have more political credibility to convince the electorate of the need for reform and, thus, labor market deregulation should have appeared under leftwing governments.
18 Botero et al. (2004) , for example, examine labor market deregulation in 85 countries and find that leftwing governments have been associated with more stringent labor regulations than rightwing governments. Di Tella and MacCulloch (2002) examine unemployment benefits in OECD countries in the 1971-1989 period and find that leftwing governments have provided more generous unemployment benefits than rightwing governments. Overall, however, economic variables such as unemployment and interest rates appear to be more important determinants of unemployment benefits than political variables. Johansen et al. (2007) investigate whether government ideology influenced wage setting in Norway. Their results suggest that changing from a conservative to a social democratic government significantly reduces manufacturing wages and makes wages more responsive to unemployment. Vaubel"s (2008: 462) case study evidence, however, suggests that labor market deregulation in the EU, did not appear to be related to government ideology.
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The threat of international outsourcing may also influence labor market institutions for several reasons. First, globalization might operate via the threat of outsourcing. 19 Second, globalization may increase the incentives for international outsourcing (Lommerud et al. 2009 ).
Third, outsourcing is likely to have an influence on wages for both skilled and unskilled domestic workers. 20 As such, outsourcing will have backfiring effects on unemployment and domestic labor market institutions. I acknowledge that all these potential concerns have not been addressed in my econometric models. Considering the threat of international outsourcing as a cause for reforms of labor market institutions and attempts to measure the threat of international outsourcing certainly remain as worthwhile endeavors for future research.
28 Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses ***, ** and * indicate significance at the level of 1, 5 and 10%, respectively Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses ***, ** and * indicate significance at the level of 1, 5 and 10%, respectively Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses ***, ** and * indicate significance at the level of 1, 5 and 10%, respectively Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses ***, ** and * indicate significance at the level of 1, 5 and 10%, respectively Porta et al. (1999) 
